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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
JAIME M. LONGORIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20070218-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Orem City's brief incorrectly misdirects and inaccurately distinguishes the 
Court from the appropriateness of the authority relied on by Mr. Longoria. The 
Constitutional and legal principles present in the fleeing cases relied on in the 
authority presented by Mr. Longoria are equally present in his refusal case and 
require this Court's attention in reversing the conviction and remanding for a new 
trial. 
The instructions given in this case during the second trial failed to 
appropriately instruct the jury that the choices of Mr. Longoria to refuse field 
sobriety tests and the chemical test may have been based on reasons consistent 
with innocence. Without that language, the instruction violated state and federal 
constitutional rights denying him due process rights and rights to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT REFUSALS TO DO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
AND A CHEMICAL TEST MAY BE SUPPORTED BY REASONS 
COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE. 
Appellant Jaime Longoria urges reversal in this case because his 
rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed under both the state and federal 
constitutions were violated when the trial court gave the jury two different jury 
instructions about the refusal evidence (both the refusal to perform field sobriety 
tests and the refusal to submit to a chemical test) which omitted requested and 
required language indicating that the two refusals each may be supported by 
reasons completely consistent with innocence. 
The City asserts that Mr. Longoria, in his brief, inappropriately relies 
on case authority from flight cases which the City claims are inapposite to the 
refusal scenario at Bar. Brief of Appellee at.5-15. The City argues that the 
differences between the two substantive topics are different from a relevance 
perspective such that the authority does not control. Brief of Appellee at 7. The 
City further contends that flight cases can abound with innocent explanations 
where refusal cases simply cannot. Brief of Appellee at 9.1 A number of similar 
1
 Curiously, the authority the City relies on for this proposition is none other than 
Judge Backlund who denied the requested language after having granted the new 
trial at least in part on this very point. See Brief of Appellee at 10, citing Jury 
Trial Transcript at 6. 
2 
reasons are urged upon the Court to discount and reject Mr. Longoria's claim of 
reversible error. After belaboring its position and reiterating its premise, however, 
the City makes a critical observation, conceding the following: 
The fact that most reasonable people would view Longoria's refusal to test 
as an indication of Longoria's impairment is simply an unfortunate reality 
that Longoria must, in fairness, be required to face. 
Brief of Appellee at 16. The City is accurate in its assessment that most people 
would view a refusal to test as requested by the officer as an indication of 
impairment; however, the City is misguided in its assertion that it somehow is 
entitled to and/or should benefit from the choice of Mr. Longoria, or of any other 
such suspect, to invoke a legal right the statutory framework allows him, i.e., to 
refuse to participate or conform to the request of a test. It is precisely because of 
this assessment conceded by the City that the cautionary instruction language is 
required in this case just as it was in the fleeing authority relied on by Mr. 
Longoria. 
Moreover, contrary to the City's assertion, case authority exists which 
would disagree with the City's argument that no innocent explanation exists for a 
refusal to comply with an officer's request to test. Some of that authority goes so 
far as to state (somewhat ironically given the City's relevance argument) that 
refusals themselves are not relevant in a criminal case and should not be admitted 
in the case in chief. People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775 (Mich.App. 1984)(evidence 
of a refusal to take the tests provided by statute should not be admitted in the case 
in chief as it is not evidence of guilt or innocence). The Washington Supreme 
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Court addressed the issue under its statutory scheme noting the following: "A 
defendant may have valid reasons for refusing a test, reasons which do not reflect 
consciousness of guilt; it is probable that the jury will ascribe undue weight to the 
refusal." State v. Zwicker, 713 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Wash 1984). Later that court 
added, 
The admission of refusal evidence for the sole purpose of explaining why 
no Breathalyzer test was given is not probative of the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of guilt. Such evidence neither 
proves nor disproves the accusation that the defendant was affected by 
alcohol. 
Id. 
Other cases which have examined the issue conclude that refusal evidence 
to be admissible must contain either a warning that the evidence can be used in a 
criminal prosecution or that a cautionary instruction must be given. State v. 
Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984)(Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled on 
state constitutional grounds following remand from the United States Supreme 
Court deciding that failure to inform Neville of the admission of the refusal at his 
criminal trial was in violation of due process and the prohibition against self-
incrimination.); State v. Zwicker, 713 P.2d at 1109 (Washington's implied 
consent statute requires the accused be warned that a refusal may be used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding). In Michigan, the Court of Appeals held in 1984 
that evidence of a refusal is not admitted in the case in chief, if such evidence 
comes in by inadvertence or in rebuttal then the following instruction is required 
to be given if requested by either party. 
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Evidence was admitted in this case which if believed by the jury, could 
prove that the defendant had exercised his or her right to refuse a chemical 
test. You are instructed that such a refusal is within statutory rights of the 
defendant and is not evidence of his guilt. You are not to consider such a 
refusal in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775, 802 (Mich.App. 1984). 
Contrary to the City's declaration that no reasons consistent with innocence 
existing to justify a refusal, there are many. A few such reasons consistent with 
innocence include frustration with the officers treatment to that point, perception 
of racist behavior by the officer, sexist behavior, poor conditions to perform tests, 
general clumsiness or lack of coordination which renders someone unable to 
perform, fear of needles, concern of contamination, religious reasons, injury, 
nervousness, lack of trust of the officer. Many other such reasons could be 
contemplated. 
Admittedly, no Utah authority exists on this point besides the governing 
statutes. That authority clearly indicates there is a "repercussion" in the Utah 
driver license hearing arena for this choice of refusal made by a suspect. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-524. But any such repercussion is neither expressly permitted 
nor allowed in the criminal arena. A legion of authority exists defining the rights 
against self-incrimination in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and the Miranda 
progeny which appropriately instruct that whenever a suspect invokes a lawful 
right available to him that the invocation of the right cannot be used or construed 
against him. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Likewise, fourth amendment jurisprudence does not permit prosecutors in a 
criminal case to use a suspect's refusal to consent to a search as grounds to support 
probable cause; rather, it is the suspect's right to refuse to cooperate with a 
requested search. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). The City's claim 
that fingerprint and voice samples are more analogous is incorrect. Brief of 
Appellee at 11. Unlike those rights listed above, fingerprint and voice samples 
are specifically permitted to be obtained over the objection of the accused if 
probable cause is established by the prosecutor. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. As discussed above, in field sobriety tests and chemical tests an 
accused is authorized to refuse without the prosecutor's ability to force a test. 
While our statute allows the admission of the refusal, inappropriate 
instructions like those given in this case run contrary to these longstanding 
principles discussed above designed to protect against inappropriate inferences 
being drawn from invoking a legal right to refuse to take a test. 
When coupled with due process considerations as urged in Mr. Longoria's 
Opening Brief, considerations of fundamental fairness, the presumption of 
innocence and the allocation of the burden of proof require that trial courts instruct 
juries appropriately to maintain the rights defendants enjoy under the 
constitutions. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979), explained years ago that instructions capable of interpretation by the 
jury as being mandatory or conclusive are violative of the burden of proof 
6 
standard and the presumption of innocence. The Court provided the rationale as 
follows: 
[G]iven the lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the 
presumption, we cannot discount the possibility that the jury may have 
interpreted the instruction in either of two more stringent ways. 
First, a reasonable jury could well have interpreted the presumption as 
"conclusive," that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but rather as 
an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the 
facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have 
interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the 
defendants voluntary actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unless 
the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may 
well have been considerably greater than "some" evidence-thus effectively 
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. 
Id. at 517 (emphasis added). 
For these same reasons the Utah Supreme Court inarguably criticized the 
instruction that has been discussed in the briefs from State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 
(Utah 1983). The instruction at issue in Bales read as follows: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact 
which, if proven, may be considered by you in the light of all other proven 
facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to 
which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. 
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inference of 
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission. 
Id. at 574. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the first paragraph of this instruction 
was acceptable, in part due to the language that the flight was not itself sufficient 
to establish guilt. The Court found that the language of the second paragraph to 
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be improper and suggested the language urged on the court as necessary in this 
case: 
We are also persuaded that the first paragraph of the flight instruction 
given in this case was acceptable in view of the evidence. It should, 
however, have incorporated two further ideas. A flight instruction will not 
be completely free from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may 
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect 
actual guilt of the crime charged. 
In contrast, we can find no justification for the second paragraph of the 
flight instruction given to the jury in this case. Indeed, the State does not 
even attempt to justify it. So far as we have been able to determine, the 
idea that flight constitutes an "implied admission" of guilt is not supported 
by any federal or state decision or by any of the analysis justifying flight 
instructions. 
Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added). 
Comparing the instructions given in this case by the trial court with the 
instructions reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court in the supporting case authority 
demonstrates the erroneous instructions violated those rights. 
Instruction No. 8 [the new trial] 
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor 
vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test 
or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining whether 
he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof. 
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test 
of his breath, blood or urine to determine the person's blood or breath 
alcohol level. 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to 
the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by 
the officer, just as you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to 
you. 
8 
R. 228. 
Instruction No. 9 [the new trial] 
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to 
perform field sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give 
whatever weight you determine to the fact that the defendant refused to 
perform any field sobriety tests. 
R. 227. 
These jury instructions given by the court in this case were improper as 
they provided a directive to the jury to use his failure to take the tests against him. 
The instructions left no ability to rebut the inference the City conceded was 
present with most reasonable jurors permitting a shift in the burden of proof to the 
Defendant and resulted in substantial adverse effects on the rights of the defendant 
to due process of law, a fair jury trial, and ultimately a fair verdict entered by a 
properly instructed jury based on the appropriate law. Mr. Longoria insists that 
had appropriate instructions been given, the jury would likely have reached a 
different verdict. 
Finally, the City's assertion that if there was error in the instruction, that 
error would be harmless and not require reversal is itself erroneous. The standard 
of review in issues of jury instructions, as identified by the parties, is presented as 
a question of law to be reviewed under a correction of error standard. Brief of 
Appellant at iii; Brief of Appellee at 1. No deference is to be given the trial court. 
Brief of Appellee at 1. 
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In Sullivan v. Louisianna, 508 U.S. 275 (1973), the United States Supreme 
Court unanimously held that a constitutionally-deficient reasonable doubt 
instruction was structural. By structural the Court meant that the error was not 
reviewable under a harmless error analysis. The Court reasoned that "where the 
instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which 
vitiates all the juryfs findings," no jury verdict of beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
exists upon which to base a harmless error analysis. Id. at 281 (emphasis in 
original). The Court continued: 
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the 
question whether the same verdict of guilty beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly 
meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless error 
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a 
jury would surely have foundpetitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-
not that that jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is 
not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for 
the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual finding of 
guilty. 
The deprivation of that right [to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every element of an offense], with consequences that are necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural 
error. 
Id. at 281-82. 
Inasmuch as these errors complained of herein likewise go directly to the 
burden of proof and presumption of innocence guaranteed to Mr. Longoria, they 
also are structural and go directly to the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due 
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process, the Court's failure to properly instruct, when authority existed to justify 
the requested instructions, reversal is required. In fact, the court had used the 
same authority to grant the new trial in the case based on the arguments signing 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law citing the consideration. R. 148, point 
3. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution's case focused on Mr. Longoria's refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test and the presumption that 
these refusals established his guilt. As such, the impact of the improper jury 
instructions had on this case was substantial; and absent these improper 
instructions, the jury's verdict would have been different. 
THEREFORE, Mr. Longoria respectfully requests that this Court find that 
there was an error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon his 
rights to due process and a fair and impartial jury trial meriting the convictions be 
reversed and a decision entered granting a new trial in this matter. 
DATED this2£ day of January, 2008. 
JASON SCHATZ(# 9969) 
Attorney for Appellant 
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